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Carolina General Assembly to achieve the dual objective of insuring that
trustees maintain a high standard of responsibility and at the same time
assist North Carolina taxpayers in contests with the government.
The General Assembly has demonstrated its awareness of the possible
tax consequences to the settlor who incorporates all of the powers in North
Carolina General Statutes section 32-27. But the admonition that "[n] o
power . . . shall be exercised by such fiduciary in such a manner as,
in the aggregate, to deprive the trust or the estate ... of [a] tax exemp-
tion, deduction or credit ... ,"' is probably totally ineffective as a tax
avoidance device because it not only provides no standard by which the
trustee may govern his conduct but also provides no standard by which
the courts may supervise a fiduciary's management of a trust.
Any statute that would limit the discretionary powers of a trustee to
compliance with usual or common law fiduciary principles or which would
impose active supervision of trusts by the courts is bound to negate part of
the freedom that many estate planners seek in setting up trusts with broad
management powers. Yet when one considers the need for continued
fiduciary responsibility and the added incentive of protection from tax
liability, the price may not be high at all.
MIKE CRUMP
Federal Jurisdiction-The Property Eights Exception to Civil Rights
Jurisdiction Under Section 1343(3)
Section 1343 of Title 28 of the United States Code vests the federal
district courts with
original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be
commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by
any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States .... 1
Section 1343(3), available regardless of the amount in controversy, is
important to potential litigants who desire a federal forum for the
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-26(b) (1966).
128 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
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resolution of constitutional issues but are unable to meet the threshold
jurisdictional amount requirement of the general federal question juris-
dictional grant.2 The most problematical aspect of section 1343(3) is the
restriction, spawned by Justice Stone in Hague v. CIO,8 excluding suits
to redress deprivations of "property rights."' That restriction, not found
in the language of the statute, has plagued the federal courts since its
inception in 1939; 5 has driven some courts to great lengths to avoid deal-
ing with the issue;' and has led to directly contradictory results.7 This
note examines the origin and development of the "property rights" excep-
tion.
Although originating in the Civil Rights Act of April 20, 1871,8
section 1343 (3) was first subjected to meaningful scrutiny by the Supreme
Court in Hague, in which jurisdiction was sustained under that statute
in an action brought to enjoin interference by city officials with dis-
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 ex-
clusive of interest or costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties
of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964). Section 1331 (a) is derived from the Act of March 3,
1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. For a general discussion of the Act of 1875, see
Aycock, Introduction to Certain Members of the Federal Question Family, 49
N.C.L. REv. 1, 23 (1970).
307 U.S. 496 (1939).
'See p. 821-22 infra.
'In Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), after reviewing the cases in
the area, judge Friendly remarked: "We must confess we are not altogether
clear just where this leaves us." Id. at 565.
'E.g., in Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970), the court characterized
a -landlord's lien statute as authorizing unreasonable invasions of the human right
of privacy in order to avoid the "property rights" jurisdictional issue, while never
mentioning the privacy consideration in the discussion of the merits of the constitu-
tional attack on the statute.
' Compare, e.g., Euge v. Trantina, 422 F.2d 1070 (8th Cir. 1970), with Blume
v. City of Deland, 358 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966).
'Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. The substantive provision of this
Act is now found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). For a general discussion of section
1983, see Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1871: Continuing Vitality, 40 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 70 (1964).
Most courts agree that section 1343(3) is the jurisdictional companion of sec-
tion 1983. and that the two sections are coextensive, at least in the sense that
section 1343(3) will afford jurisdiction for any suit brought under section 1983.
See, e.g., AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 590 (1946) (dictum); National Land
& Inv. Co. v. Specter, 428 F.2d 91, 93-100 (3d Cir. 1970). If sections 1343(3) and
1983 are coextensive, any restriction on section 1343(3) would also be a restriction
on the substantive section 1983. But see McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 250
(2d Cir. 1969), indicating that section 1343(3) may be narrower than section 1983.
See also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403 (1970), and Hall v. Garson, 430
F.2d 430, 438 (5th Cir. 1970), which indicate that 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1964)
affords jurisdiction for suits under section 1983.
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semination of literature concerning, and assembly for discussion of, the
National Labor Relations Act.9 In his concurring opinion,'" Justice Stone
viewed the jurisdictional issue as requiring definition of the extent of the
overlap" between the 1871 Act and the Act of 1875,"2 which had extended
general federal question jurisdiction to the lower federal courts. Justice
Stone reasoned that neither statute should be taken as abrogating the
other, and in his attempt to harmonize them he initially stated that this
was best done by construing section 1343(3) to confer "federal juris-
diction of suits brought under the Act of 1871 in which the right asserted
is inherently incapable of pecuniary valuation."' Precedent supporting
this distinction was found by comparing Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing
Co.,14 in which the Court had denied jurisdiction under section 1343 (3)
in a suit to enjoin taxation of patent rights, with Truax v. Raick, 5 in
which the Court had sustained section 1343(3) jurisdiction in an action
brought by an alien employee to enjoin enforcement against his employer
of a statute prohibiting employment of work forces comprised of more
than twenty per cent aliens.'" Had Justice Stone concluded his opinion
without more, one might logically have thought that the crucial aspect of
Truax was the discrimination against aliens. But Justice Stone pro-
ceeded to approve Crane v. Johnson, 7 in which the Court sustained
section 1343(3) jurisdiction in a suit brought by a doctor, who healed
by mental suggestion, to enjoin enforcement of a statute requiring exam-
ination for licensing. The statute was alleged to deny equal protectiorf
by exempting certain practitioners who used prayer to heal. At this
0 307 U.S. at 501-04.
" Unfortunately, there was no opinion of the Court on the jurisdictional issue,
or on the merits, for that matter. Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Black con-
curred, thought that section 1343(3) originated in the Civil Rights Act of April 9,
1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, and that it afforded jurisdiction in suits by United States
citizens to redress deprivations of their rights, privileges, and immunities as such.
Finding a claim set out under the privileges and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment, Justice Roberts had little difficulty sustaining jurisdiction.
307 U.S. at 508 & n.10, 512. The dissenters did not discuss jurisdiction. Id. at
532-33.
"1307 U.S. at 529-30. Justice Stone noted that the language of the Act of 1871
extended broadly to secure to all persons-whether citizens or not-any right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution, and rejected the argument that
the term "secured" in section 1343(3) means created rather than protected. Id. at
519, 525-27."' See note 2 supra.
307 U.S. at 530 (emphasis added).
1,176 U.S. 68 (1900).
"239 U.S. 33 (1915).
"307 U.S. at 530-31.
17242 U.S. 339 (1917).
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point one might have concluded that to Justice Stone the common de-
nominator in Crane and Truax was the right to work, which, surprisingly,
was viewed as being incapable of pecuniary valuation. However, after
citing Crane with approval Justice Stone shifted the emphasis from the
ability to assign a monetary value to the right to the personal nature of
that right; he thought it important to note that in both Crane and Truax
the right asserted was one of "personal freedom" arising under the equal
protection clause, and that "in both the gist of the cause of action was not
damage or injury to property, but unconstitutional infringement of a right
of personal liberty not susceptible of valuation in money."' 8 The shift was
completed when Justice Stone ended his opinion with the assertion that
[t]he conclusion seems inescapable that the right conferred by the
Act of 1871 to maintain a suit in equity in the federal courts to protect
the suitor against a deprivation of rights or immunities secured -by the
Constitution, has been preserved, and that whenever the right or im-
munity is one of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence upon
the infringement of property rights, there is jurisdiction in the district
courts under [section 1343(3)] to entertain it without proof [of an]
amount in controversy .... 19
Although Justice Stone's distinction has been expressly rejected in iso-
lated cases,20 and, more frequently, ignored2 or prudently circumvented,22
the majority of the lower courts have attempted to discern and follow his
principle, with the consequent expenditure of a great deal of judicial time
and energy. Unfortunately, the result is a general state of confusion flow-
ing from a basic failure to agree on what "property rights" are.2" For the
18 307 U.S. at 531.
Id. at 531-32 (emphasis added).
"oE.g., in Joe Louis Milk Co. v. Hershey, 243 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ill. 1965),
the court remarked that "[n]o difference in constitutional protection between prop-
erty rights and human rights is expressed in the language of § 1343 itself," and that
"[n]either logic nor policy compels the conclusion that property rights are less
deserving of protection under the Constitution and Civil Rights Act than are human
freedoms. .. ." Id. at 354.
1 E.g., Blume v. City of Deland, 358 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Cobb v. City of
Malden, 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953)." E.g., McGuire v. Sadler, 337 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1964).
8 At least one potential issue has been resolved, for it seems settled that section
1343(3) affords jurisdiction in suits for damages as well as in those for injunctive
relief. E.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). This balm exists
despite the fact that both justice Stone's opinion in Hague and section 1343 itself
could be read as implying exclusion of damage actions. Justice Stone spoke of the
maintenance of a "suit in equity" and of rights "not susceptible of valuation in
[Vol. 49
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most part individual courts have seized upon one or the other, but not
both, of Justice Stone's apparently nonidentic initial and final formulations
of his distinction as the correct expression of the section 1343(3) juris-
dictional grant. Thus one of the two prevailing statements of the section
1343(3) test requires the right asserted to be "incapable of pecuniary
valuation,"2 and the other formulation demands that the right be one
of" 'personal liberty, not dependent for its existence upon the infringement
of property rights.' "25 In addition, differently phrased tests have been
applied,26 and the confusion is compounded by the occasional inter-
changeable use of the tests2 7 and by the tendency of courts to give the
complaint an expansive or narrow reading depending on what result seems
desirable.2"
As is to be expected, uniform results generally obtain in cases in
which the right asserted passes muster under either or neither of the two
principal tests. Thus when the action is for damages for a mere economic
loss, section 1343(3) jurisdiction is denied.9 On the other extreme,
when the suit is brought for injunctive relief against unconditional denials
of rights traditionally denominated "civil," such as the rights of free
speech and assembly involved in Hague, the courts find no difficulty in
sustaining jurisdiction."0 The midpoint is marked by the troublesome cases
in which either test may reasonably be thought to require either a finding
money." 307 U.S. at 331-32. Sections 1343(1) and (2) grant jurisdiction in suits
"to recover damages." Section 1343(4) grants jurisdiction in suits to "recover
damages or to secure equitable or other relief." But section 1343(3) affords juris-
diction in suits "to redress" deprivations of rights. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
2 Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 259 F. Supp. 486, 492
(M.D. Tenn. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 386 U.S. 262 (1967).
'Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 1969), quoting Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496, 531 (1939).
" E.g., Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 864 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1970) ("civil rights"); Ream
v. Handley, 359 F.2d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 1966) (no section 1343(3) jurisdiction to
protect "property or monetary rights").7 E.g., McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1969).
28E.g., in Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1970), a suit to enjoin eviction from
public housing, the court characterized the claim as being the deprivation of "pro-
cedural due process, a civil right, which may ultimately lead to the loss of a prop-
erty right, to wit, tenancy in public housing projects." Id. at 864.
2'E.g., City of Boulder v. Snyder, 396 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1051 (1969) ; Ream v. Handley, 359 F.2d 728 (7th Cir. 1966).
" E.g., Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969) (interference
by policemen with photographers' right to record news); Dawley v. City of
Norfolk, 260 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959) (suit to
compel removal of the word "colored" from courthouse restrooms).
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or denial of jurisdiction. One example is Gold v. Lomenao,31 in which
section 1343(3) jurisdiction was sustained in an action to enjoin the
suspension of a real estate brokerage license. In Gold, Judge Friendly
remarked that "a challenge to the revocation of a license to engage in an
occupation 'can be viewed about equally well as complaining of a depriva-
tion of the personal liberty to pursue a calling of one's choice or of the
profits or emoluments deriving therefrom.' "32 Judge Friendly's state-
ment was rendered in the context of his application of the test requiring
the right asserted to be one of "personal liberty. ' 33 However, if the right
in Gold is not viewed merely as the deprivation of economic benefits, it
may be classified as incapable of monetary valuation as well as a right of
personal liberty. Some courts have aided their inquiry in close cases by
drawing a distinction according to plaintiff's purpose in bringing the
suit,3 4 although the great majority of the cases never mention that purpose,
and it has been said to be irrelevant.
3 5
Notwithstanding the general confusion, results may be accurately
predicted in several specific analytical categories of cases.30 One instance
is the area of state taxation, where Justice Stone's distinction and the
result in Holt have clearly prevailed, although not wholly without re-
sistance." Since 1962, the Supreme Court has affirmed, without com-
ment, three district court decisions applying the property rights exception
to deny section 1343(3) jurisdiction in suits attacking, respectively, the
application of income taxation,38 the application of ad valorem taxation, 9
"425 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1970).
"Id. at 961, quoting Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 565 (2d Cir. 1969).
" In Eisen v. Eastman, 421, F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), decided before Gold,
Judge Friendly had concluded that the proper section 1343(3) test is whether
the "right asserted is one of personal liberty." Id. at 564 & n.7 .
"E.g., Pierre v. Jordan, 333 F.2d 951, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 974 (1965).
"Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 F. Supp. 1397, 1401-02 (D. Colo.),
aff'd per curiam, 399 U.S. 901 (1970).
" Several important classes of suits other than those discussed in the text are
well settled. Thus, section 1343(3) affords jurisdiction in suits to apportion,
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); to protect the right to attend integrated
schools, McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); and to protect the right
of residents of a federal enclave to vote, Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
"' Chief Judge Johnson, dissenting in Hornbeak v. Hamm, 283 F. Supp. 549
(M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 9 (1969), felt that denying juris-
diction in an action to compel uniform assessment and valuation for ad valorem
taxation purposes was tantamount to finding that state taxation procedures are not
subject to the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 556.
" Abernathy v. Carpenter, 208 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Mo. 1962), aff'd per curiam,
373 U.S. 241 (1963).
"' Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 259 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 386 U.S. 262 (1967).
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and the administration of ad valorem taxation.40 The lower -courts, have
followed these results.
4
There is an obvious overlap between income or ,ad valoren taxation'
and a requirement of a license, purchased for a fee, as a condition precedent
to a specified activity. But there seems to be a crucial difference inthe-two
under section 1343 (3), just as there is a constitutional difference under
the commerce clause.4 2 In Douglas v. City of Jeannette,43 the Court.
sustained jurisdiction under section 1343 (3) in a suit brought by Jehovah's
Witnesses to enjoin the application to them of a license tax on door-to-
door solicitation as a denial of freedom of religion, speech, and press.
Since the license could have been purchased for money, Douglas may be
read as casting doubt on the validity of the "incapable of pecuniary val-
uation" test, and thus as lending credence to the "personal liberty" test.
On the other hand, if the rights asserted in Douglas are classified simply
as freedom of religion, speech, and press, jurisdiction would probably be
sustained under either of the two tests. Thus Douglas may also be read.
as requiring an expansive reading of the complaint in identifying the right
asserted and a disregard of the nature of the invasion of that right After
Douglas, the courts properly have had little difficulty sustaining juris-
diction in actions attacking the denial of licenses required for noncom-
mercial pursuits;44 section 1343 (3) jurisdiction also has been sustained in
the cases seeking to enjoin denials of licenses and permits required for
commerical activities.45
" Hornbeak v. Hamm, 283 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd per curiam,
393 U.S. 9 (1969)."E.g., Bussie v. Long, 383 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1967); Gray V' Morgan, 371
F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1033 (1967).
With respect to the taxation cases, it should be remembered that ordinarily a!f
of the subject property would never'be taken. In addition, the strong policy against
interference with state taxation embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964), must b6
considered.
Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323 (3d'Cir. 1965), raises an interestirg issue: Therein
jurisdiction was denied under section 1343(3) in a suit by taxpayers and parents
to enjoin a school board plan to eliminate de facto segregation and ti enjoin ex-
penditures to implement the plan. Would a suit brought by one who has -standing
only as a taxpayer ever nestle into section 1343 (3)?, The answer would probably
be yes in at least one situation. When the attack is under the establishment of
religion clause of the first amendment, the essence of the objection would be
the use to which the money is put, rather than the .taking of it. See, e.g.,' Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
" Compare Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959), with Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1.946).
" 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
"E.g., Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915
(1953) (suspension of driver's license).
"E.g., Gold v. Lomenzo, 425 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1970) (license for real estate
1971]
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Somewhat the same considerations obtain in the employment cases as
in those concerning permits for commercial activities. Both recognize,
impliedly or expressly,46 that the right to pursue one's chosen occupation
is not a "property right." Thus section 1343(3) jurisdiction has been
upheld in actions to compel reinstatement after alleged racial discrimina-
tion in the failure to renew employment contracts,47 and after dismissal
alleged to have denied procedural due process 8 The difference that has
been recognized at least once between dismissal and a mere reduction in
salary 9 suggests that the problem may be one of degree. However, a more
obvious distinction is that dismissal operates to preclude the income-
producing conduct itself, while a salary reduction merely makes the
conduct less economically beneficial.
Like the employment cases, the welfare cases involve loss of economic
benefits. Yet jurisdiction under section 1343(3) is uniformly upheld in
them. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not seen fit to discuss the
scope of section 1343(3) in the recent rash of welfare cases decided by it,
other than to render an occasional general remark. In Goldberg v.
Kelly,50 the Court sustained section 1343(3) jurisdiction in an action
brought to redress the alleged denial of procedural due process in the
termination of welfare benefits. Although section 1343(3) was not dis-
cussed, the Court did take note of the potential deprivation of "essential
food, clothing, housing, and medical care," and of the fact that such
terminations "may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by
which to live."51 In Dandridge v. Williams" the Court, without com-
ment, sustained jurisdiction in a suit attacking, on equal protection
grounds, a ceiling placed on welfare benefits without regard to actual
need or family size. Finally, in Rosado v. Wymant 3 the Court sustained
jurisdiction under section 1343 (3) in an action challenging, on equal pro-
brokerage); Parks v. Allen, 409 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1969) (license for operation
of a retail liquor store)."E.g., in Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970), the court
remarked that even if the property rights exception is accepted, "plaintiff's claim
to a denial of employment is in the nature of a right far more precious than 'mere
property' and certainly incapable of precise pecuniary measure." Id. at 1245-46.
"'Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist, 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Feb. 12, 1971).
Taylor v. New York City Transit Auth., 433 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1970).
'9 Kochhar v. Auburn Univ., 304 F. Supp. 565 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
0397 U.S. 254 (1970).
' Id. at 264.
52397 U.S. 471 (1970).
58397 U.S. 397 (1970).
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tection grounds, a New York statute providing for smaller welfare pay-
ments to Nassau County residents than to New York City residents.
These cases would support the proposition that the circumstances and
probable effect of a "taking of property" are entitled to consideration in
determining section 1343(3) jurisdiction, and clearly recognize the
reality that a "taking of property" always interferes with "personal
rights" to some degree. Moreover, since Dandridge and Rosado did not
involve complete withdrawal of benefits, it is arguable that the degree of
interference is immaterial in sensitive areas such as welfare admin-
istration.
Eviction from and termination of leases in public housing are apt to
visit the same type of hardship on the plaintiff as denial of welfare
benefits, although perhaps statistically to a lesser degree. Here, too, sec-
tion 1343 (3) jurisdiction has been sustained.5"
Thus, the cases discussed, as well as others,5" indicate that one may,
with some confidence, consider plaintiff's personal circumstances in de-
termining whether plaintiff has been denied a "personal right" because of
the deprivation of a "property right." Yet the crucial issue remains: how
is it to be determined whether the right allegedly denied is a "personal"
one within the protection of section 1343 (3) ?
Obviously it is not enough that plaintiff alleges a violation of broad
and general prohibitions, such as the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has both sus-
tained and denied section 1343(3) jurisdiction when the plaintiff was
relying on the equal protection clause," and the same is true with respect
"E.g., Caulder v. Durham Housing Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3314 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1971) (No. 1227); Es-
calera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 39
U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1970).
" E.g., in Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), a suit to enjoin the low-
ering of rent ceilings under a city rent control law, judge Friendly, after concluding
that the proper test was whether the "right asserted is one of personal liberty,"
id. at 564 & n.7 , held that section 1343 (3) did not afford jurisdicton because plain-
tiff had alleged only the loss of money. Id. at 566. On the other hand, in Klim v.
Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970), a suit brought by a painter to redress
the seizure of personal papers and painting implements by his landlord under an
innkeepers' lien law, the court sustained section 1343(3) jurisdiction, reasoning
that plaintiff's "claim is not for 'mere' property, but rather for property which is
his means of employment and support and hence is incapable of pecuniary measure."
Id. at 115. See also Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970). But see Lynch
v. Household Finance Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Conn. 1970).
" Compare, e.g., Hornbeak v. Hamm, 393 U.S. 9 (1969), aff'g per curare
283 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Ala. 1968), with Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
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to the due process clause.5 7 Thus, under the prevailing approach, the court
must first characterize the right asserted in terms more narrow than the
broad prohibition underlying the right, and then apply its test to determine
whether the right is one of "personal liberty" or "property."
The' difficulties attendant to such an analysis are amply illustrated by
Adams v. City of Colorado Springs.58 Therein property owners and voters
sued to enjoin a proposed annexation on the ground that the statute estab-
lishing the annexation procedure denied equal protection when it afforded
prospective annexees in certain areas a vote on the proposal but denied
it to those in other areas. Although defendants asserted that plaintiffs
were concerned only with increased taxation, the district court character-
ized the complaint as setting up the deprivation of "a substantial per-
sonal right-the right to equal treatment in the distribution of the voting
franchise," and upheld jurisdiction under section 1343(3)." Since some
persons were permitted to vote because they were property owners, the
right asserted in Adams could be characterized as the right to exercise
the incidents of ownership of property. Or, as defendants wished, it could
be described as the right not to pay increased taxes for unwanted city
services. It is obvious that in any case there is a wide range of possible
descriptions of the right involved. And in many cases that range could
include both those that seem "personal" or "incapable of pecuniary val-
uation" and those that seem to be "property rights."' Such is the present
potential for uncertainty and inconsistency.
A suggestion for avoidance of the unsatisfactory existing approach
may be found in the very origin of the problem-Justice Stone's opinion
in Hague. Unfortunately, the courts have neglected 'that portion of the
opinion in which Justice Stone discussed Truax and Crane. Arguably,
justice Stone used his phrases in the disjunctive and thought that a com-
plaint sets out "a right of personal liberty not susceptible of valuation
in money" whenever "the gist of the cause of action is not damage or
injury to property.'0 1 Adoption of the latter phrase as the section 1343 (3)
test would immediately eliminate the disparity in results due to the real or
supposed differences in the "personal liberty" and "incapable of pecuniary
valuation" tests. Moreover, by recognizing, as the welfare cases clearly
" Compare, e.g., Alterrhan Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 386 U.S.
262 (1967), aff'g per curiam 259 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), with Douglas
v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
308 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Colo.), aff'd per curian, 399 U.S. 901 (1970).
Id. at 1401-02.
0oSee p. 824 & note 32 supra.
"' See p. 822 & note 18 supra.
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suggest, that the gist of a cause of action may be something other than
a mere wrongful reduction in plaintiff's net economic worth because of the
effect of a "taking of property,""2 this rule would offer the distinct ad-
vantage of reconciling many of the otherwise apparently inconsistent re-
sults.
It is submitted that the, rule suggested is to be preferred over the
existing state of disagreement and confusion. It is not at all clear that
Justice Stone did not have it in mind, and it should be remembered that
for the most part Justice Stone was arguing positively to sustain juris-
diction in Hague, rather than negatively to deny it." As noted earlier,
the language of section 1343(3) does not require the property rights
exception."4 Moreover, the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted 42
U.S.C. § 1983-the substantive companion of section 1343 (3) - - . to em-
brace all rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.6  ,]Finally, it is
arguable that the Civil Rights Acts themselves cast doubt on the property
rights exception.
67
Even the need to harmonize sections 1331 and 1343(3), which con-
cerned Justice Stone, is more apparent than real. The mostexpansive
reading of section 1343(3) would not make section 1331 superfluous,
since by its terms section 1343(3) extends only to state, not federal,
action. Moreover, the total repeal of the jurisdictional amount require-
ment in section 1331 has been forcefully advocated," since its application
is virtually limited to cases involving state action,69 for which federal
.See pp. 826-27 supra.
307 U.S. at 527-32.
a" One recent case seems to have arrived at a correct result guided solely by the
language of the statute. See Caulder v. Durham Housing Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th
Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3314 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1971) (No.
1227).
° See note 8 supra.
'G Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
07 E.g., section two of the Act of 1871 specifically punished conspiracies aimed
at preventing enforcement of the Act by injuring the property or person of a United
States officer, juror, etc., charged with a duty under the Act. Act of April 20, 1871,
ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13. Therefore, section one, from which section 1343(3) is
derived and which is broader than section two, should be construed to protect prop-
erty also. For arguments that the Civil Rights Acts preclude recognition of the
property rights exception see Laufer, Hague v. C.I.O.: Mr. Justice ,Stone's Test of
Federal Jurisdiction-A Reappraisal, 19 BuFFALO L. Rnv. 547, 559-61 (1970);
Note, The "Property Rights" Exception to Civil Rights Jurisdiction--Confusion
Compounded, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1208, 1211 (1968).
"3 ALl STUDY OF THE DiViSON OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
CoURTs 489-92 (1969) ; Wright, Federal Question Jurisdiction, 17 S.C.L. REv. 660,
661-64 (1965).
"o Wright, supra note 68, at 663-64.
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courts are especially appropriate, and its elimination would have no sig-
nificant impact on the workload of the federal courts.7"
Finally, the rule suggested offers an opportunity to settle this area
of conflict quickly and with certainty. As Justice Brandeis once re-
marked, "in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule
be settled than that it be settled [correctly] .... "71 The Supreme Court
should take advantage of one of the opportunities certain to arise to
establish a definite rule. And if it fails to do so, Congress should.
R. B. TuCKER, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Public Purpose-Taxation and Revenue
Bonds to Finance Low-Income Housing
In Martin v. North Carolina Housing Corp.' the North Carolina
Supreme Court upheld the statute establishing the Housing Corporation
as a "public agency... empowered to act on behalf of the State... for
the purpose of providing residential housing 'for sale or rental to persons
and families of lower income.' "2 In so holding, the court resolved in favor
of the Housing Corporation challenges regarding public purpose, lending
of credit, creation of debt, delegation of legislative authority, and property
tax exemption, arising under various sections of the North Carolina
Constitution.'
The dissent singled out the noteworthy holdings of the case: public pur-
pose and tax exemption. In the latter regard the court in Martin upheld the
statutory tax exemption of the bonds to be issued by the Housing Corpo-
70Id.
n Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932).
1277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665 (1970).
2Id. at 34, 175 S.E2d at 667. The Housing Corporation was to issue self-
liquidating, tax-exempt revenue bonds and use the proceeds to purchase federally
insured mortgage and construction loans. The Housing Corporation would also
establish a housing development fund with grants and loans from industry, foun-
dations, and government to be used for project development loans, downpayment
assistance to needy families, and uninsured loans to builders and developers for
land development and residential construction. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122A-1 to -23
(Supp. 1969).
'N.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 3, limiting the power of taxation to public purposes; art.
VII, § 6, limiting the power of a municipal corporation to pledge its faith; art. V.
§ 4, limiting the power of the General Assembly to lend the credit of the State; art.
I, § 8, defining the separation of the powers of government; and, art. V, § 5,
defining the scope of the exemption of property from taxation.
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